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1377/02/22 (Solar Hijri) 1998-05-12 (Gregorian)

1377/02/22- Remarks at a Gathering of Students at the University of Tehran

1377/02/22

Remarks at a Gathering of Students of the University of Tehran

بسم‌اللَّه‌الرّحمن‌الرّحیم‌

I did not hesitate much in choosing the topic I wish to discuss with you dear students today. There are, of course, many matters worth raising and sharing with young people, especially students. As the familiar saying goes, “A whole breastful of words surges in our mouths.” Yet the subject I have chosen is something I have repeatedly considered, studied, and regarded as important. It is probably a subject that can be developed further. I am raising it for the first time today, and if I have the opportunity on later visits to this or other universities, I shall continue it. Students, especially those studying history and the social sciences, can reflect on and research the question I am raising. It concerns intellectualism and intellectuals in our country, which I consider an important subject.

First, let me say a brief word about coming here today. I decided about a week ago to come, but told nobody. Even in my office only one or two people knew. Last night I learned that several student groups intended to hold gatherings and give speeches today. I asked that they be requested to postpone their meetings so that we could hold this event. The message was conveyed and they canceled their programs.

This gives me occasion to make a point. Dear students, there is nothing wrong with speeches and gatherings, but two groups should never hold gatherings at the same university at the same time. This is my fatherly advice to you. One group may want to hold a gathering and say things it considers necessary, though another group may not consider those things necessary. Very well, meet together, but when another group sees that you are holding a meeting, it should schedule its own for another time. That is the right approach. My dear ones, what I am saying is based not on speculation but on information. There are people who want to set students against each other, preoccupy them, and keep them from their studies. They want students distracted by pointless matters. Do not yield and do not let anyone manipulate the student community.

For years I have advised students that the student is someone belonging to this particular environment. Once you leave it, you are no longer a student; another person takes your place and acquires these characteristics. Studenthood belongs to this environment. Student life is good, sacred, and sweet; to those of us who have lived many years, it is especially beautiful. Do not let conflict among yourselves destroy this student identity and the student community. Be careful. This was my advice prompted by what happened in connection with today's program; I thought I should tell you, and I have.

Now to the question of intellectualism. If I were to name the issue I have in mind, I might call it the reactionary turn of intellectuals, or reactionary intellectualism. You know that intellectualism is fundamentally opposed to reaction. It is forward-looking and oriented toward the future, the idea rendered into Persian from the French word “intellectuel,” although language specialists say that translation is not entirely accurate. Whatever the term, its meaning is understood, and I shall explain it further later. This progressive, future-oriented identity cannot be reconciled with retreat or regression. Yet I have observed, and continue to observe, a phenomenon for which I can find no better name than reactionary intellectualism, the regression of intellectualism.

I have often said that intellectualism in Iran was born sick. Intellectualism, which in practice should imply scientific thought, a forward-looking outlook, wisdom, intelligence, and sensitivity to social problems, particularly cultural ones, was born in our country unhealthy and defective. Why? Because the earliest intellectuals in our history were themselves unsound. Let me name three of these pioneers in Iran: Mirza Malkom Khan the Armenian, Mirza Fath-Ali Akhundzadeh, and Haj Sayyah Mahallati. These people brought the first signs and messages of nineteenth-century European intellectualism into Iran, but they were profoundly unreliable. For example, Mirza Malkom Khan, who claimed to be an intellectual enlightening people against the despotism of Naser al-Din Shah, was himself the broker of the highly colonial and damaging Reuter concession!

You know that in the last twenty years of Naser al-Din Shah's life, foreign monopolies devastated this country. The British would arrive and secure a monopoly—on customs, tobacco, railways, and so forth. Then the Russians would come and say: you granted our rival this exclusive concession, this so-called commercial privilege, so you must give us one too; and they would receive something as well. Later this was called “positive balance,” a balance between Russia and Britain in foreign policy and economic relations, but one based on competition. Give something to one power; the other says tomorrow, “Why was I not given anything?” and receives its share. Then the first says, “Mine was less,” and receives more. They plundered Iran for the benefit of the royal dynasty—Naser al-Din Shah, the courtiers, and anyone else who could take a bite from this feast of spoils.

That supposed intellectual, presented as the most famous herald of enlightenment in Iran—Mirza Malkom Khan—was himself a broker of the Reuter affair! In the famous tobacco monopoly, which Mirza Shirazi, the religious authority of the time, forbade and thereby stopped that damaging deal, Mirza Malkom Khan himself was a broker! Indeed, the Régie tobacco concession was among Malkom Khan's major brokerage operations, and the court approved it. And this man wanted to introduce enlightenment to Iran, to call the people toward the future, modernization and innovation. Imagine the outcome for the people!

I do not know how much you know or have read of modern history. It would be excellent if you planned to use some of your free time in the summer to study modern history, including the tobacco affair. Books have been written on the subject, and it would be appropriate to read them—reliable books, of course. Some people are so hostile to religion that when the clergy and religion are involved, they refuse to acknowledge or mention an achievement of this magnitude.

In another respect, Mirza Fath-Ali Akhundzadeh resembles Mirza Malkom Khan. Akhundzadeh came from Khameneh. I have heard and learned much about him from older people of Khameneh and some of our relatives. Before the October Revolution he went to the Caucasus, took his place at the tsars' table in Russia, and, with the tsars' help and under their protection, imagined he could begin fighting Iranian despotism! This was an unreliable struggle, and it was unacceptable. Moreover, instead of principally targeting tyranny and political issues, their first targets were religion, the people's beliefs, and authentic indigenous traditions, as I shall explain later.

Haj Sayyah is the third example. He wrote an account of his life and European travels. Anyone who reads it will have no doubt that the book seems deliberately designed to confront or suppress any mention of a great, independent-minded religious scholar wherever one appears; his name is virtually concealed and his story left untold. That is how intellectualism was born in Iran.

Subsequent generations of Iranian intellectuals were not reliable either. They were mostly princes, aristocrats, and children of the privileged. Consider the three-volume autobiography of Abdullah Mostowfi, written by the man himself. He too belonged to those intellectuals and came from the upper-class families of the Qajar establishment. He was, of course, a balanced person and does not appear to have been a negative character. Reading his book shows who the people were through whom the first banners and messages of intellectualism became visible and known. Thus passed the Qajar period: one seldom found a sincere, patriotic, impartial, compassionate intellectual among Iran's intellectual circles.

Then came the era of Reza Khan. During this period, the country's foremost intellectuals—professors, writers, and thinkers from the intellectual elite—entered Reza Khan's service, although he knew nothing of culture or learning. Their support for him had no justification: he was neither educated nor cultured nor national-minded, and everyone knew that British policies were being carried out. The intellectuals themselves saw that the British had brought Reza Khan forward, elevated him to power, strengthened his monarchy, made the preparations, removed the obstacles, and cleared his path. At that time intellectuals became the ideologues of Reza Khan's coup-born government! Whatever he wanted to do, they supplied its ideology, intellectual foundations, and justifications.

I want to discuss this with you not as an official but as a cleric, a seminarian, and someone who spent almost all his youth in the intellectual environment of his time. I knew many prominent Iranian intellectuals closely, or knew their works—their poets, writers, and artists—and I know them well. I want the young people of this generation to become somewhat familiar with their country's cultural atmosphere, because you are among the educated, intellectual strata. See where you stand, what existed, what happened, and what some want to happen next. I would like you to bear this point in mind.

After Reza Khan's departure, after September 1941, when a peculiar government was formed, some intellectuals joined the Tudeh Party. In fact, some of the most sincere intellectuals were among those who joined it, although the party depended on the Soviet Union. They admitted it themselves at the time; they all acknowledged their dependence on the Soviets. The Soviets had helped create and support them, and they acted as a Soviet fifth column in Iran.

Look at the memoirs of Kianouri and other Tudeh leaders who were arrested under the Islamic Republic. Their memoirs have been published, recounting events fifty or sixty years earlier. Although they may not have wished to tell the whole truth, their words make it perfectly clear what the Tudeh Party really was then. Even so, some of the most sincere and devoted intellectuals were in that group. One was Jalal Al-e Ahmad, whose words I shall cite during this discussion. The late Jalal Al-e Ahmad belonged to the Tudeh Party; Khalil Maleki and others also began there.

I cannot remember whether I heard this from him personally or a friend related it to me. He came to Mashhad in 1968 and we discussed many such matters at a meeting with him. I may have heard it myself, or another person may have heard it from him and told me. He reportedly said: “We kept moving from one room to another in the Tudeh Party”—meaning progressing through its ranks—“until we reached a place where we heard voices from behind a wall. We asked what was there. They said, ‘That is Moscow.’ We said, ‘Then we are not staying,’ and turned back.” In other words, as soon as they realized from the party hierarchy that it was dependent on a foreign power, they withdrew. With Khalil Maleki and others they then formed the Third Force. The sincere people were there. That period continued until around the time of Dr. Mossadegh and the coup of August 19, 1953.

After the 1953 coup, there was an extraordinary silence among intellectuals when it came to displaying the spirit of resistance to a corrupt regime that an intellectual should show. Many who had suffered the regime's wrath in the 1940s became its obedient collaborators in the 1950s! Al-e Ahmad describes the intellectuals of that decade in his book On the Service and Betrayal of Intellectuals. He began the book in 1964 and continued working on it until 1968. We met him when he visited Mashhad in 1968. The book came up in conversation and he said he had been busy with a project for some time; later we learned he had been working on it since 1964. He asked us for information on particular subjects he thought we knew about. That was when we realized he was writing this book. It was published after his death. It could not have been distributed under the former regime; it was completely banned, and publication was impossible.

Al-e Ahmad takes some very good positions in this book. Yet you see that this same Al-e Ahmad, who believed in religion and native Iranian traditions, was deeply attached to them, valued Persian language and literature, rejected Western influence, and opposed Westoxication, nevertheless thought, reflected, spoke, and judged questions of intellectualism within the framework of Western intellectualism! This is what I mean when I say that Iranian intellectualism was born sick. Wherever it continued, the illness continued too.

But what was this illness, and how did it manifest itself? I shall explain it in Al-e Ahmad's own terms. In describing the characteristics of an intellectual, he says some are popular or commonplace characteristics. By “popular,” he does not mean merely that ordinary people imagine intellectuals this way; intellectuals themselves sometimes think this way. There are three characteristics: first, opposition to religion and faith—as though an intellectual must necessarily oppose religion; second, attraction to Western customs, European ways and the like; third, formal education. These are the common notions that supposedly distinguish an intellectual. Thus a religious person could be the greatest scholar of the age, a foremost artist, or the greatest philosopher, yet would not count as an intellectual! He then says these three popular characteristics are simplified versions of two others that can be expressed in scholarly or intellectual language. One is indifference to indigenous traditions and one's own culture—which is presented as an essential feature, not merely a popular misconception. The other is belief in a scientific worldview, scientific relationships and knowledge, and rejection of fatalism. He also gives examples.

Yet the concept of intellectualism developed in Europe, which they imported, does not inherently contain this meaning, line, or orientation at all! Why must an intellectual disregard his native traditions? What is the reason? Intellectualism means an activity, occupation, or condition primarily concerned with the workings of the mind. An intellectual works more with his brain than with his arms, more with his nerves than with his muscles. That is an intellectual. Accordingly, in the categories of intellectuals he later enumerates in his book, he begins with poets, writers, thinkers, and the like, then proceeds to university professors, students, schoolteachers, and finally journalists and reporters.

Why must a person who works with his mind necessarily be alienated from, even hostile to, the traditions of his birthplace, country, homeland, and history? Why must he oppose religion? The answer emerges from what Al-e Ahmad and others have said. When the concept of the “intellectuel” first arose in France, France and Europe were emerging from the Middle Ages. They had cast off the oppressive, harsh, superstitious religion of the Church, which killed scientists, tried inventors and discoverers, exiled and destroyed them, and destroyed scientific books. Naturally wise people arose, rejected a religious establishment of that kind, full of superstitions and claims no rational person could accept, turned toward new endeavors, produced the new French encyclopedia, and began major scientific work. Turning away from that form of religion was naturally part of what they did. But the imitative Iranian intellectual under the Qajars imported the idea of the “intellectuel,” first calling it monavvar al-fekr and later rowshanfekr, together with its anti-religious character, and applied it against Islam. Yet Islam possessed the most logical thought, lucid teachings, sound arguments, and transparent ethical principles. At that same time in Iran, Islam was doing precisely what Western intellectuals wanted to do in the West! During a period of colonialism, Western intellectuals sided with the people of colonized regions. For instance, if Spain colonized Cuba and appropriated its wealth—Cuban sugar—the Frenchman Jean-Paul Sartre defended the people of Cuba, Fidel Castro, and Che Guevara against a colonial power and wrote a book about the sugar war in Cuba.

In other words, Western intellectuals at one point struggled against their own ruling governments on behalf of weaker nations. Who did that work in Iran? Mirza Shirazi, Mirza Ashtiani in Tehran, and Seyyed Abdolhossein Lari in Fars. They fought colonial penetration. But who helped conclude colonial agreements and facilitate colonial interference? Mirza Malkom Khan and others like him, along with many Qajar statesmen counted among the intellectuals. The positions were exactly reversed. Nevertheless, the intellectual struggle against superstitious Christianity was transplanted into Iran as a struggle against Islam! Thus hostility and opposition to Islam came to be treated as a characteristic of an intellectual.

Even today, descendants of the same intellectual circles of the Pahlavi era—writers, poets, researchers, editors and biographers—sometimes openly pursue the same line. They praise people like Mirza Fath-Ali Akhundzadeh almost as though praising a prophet! Because of his opposition to religion and struggle against Islam, Akhundzadeh could both sit at the tsars' table, live on their support and accept their help, and later have concerts held in his honor when the Bolsheviks and communists came to our town of Khameneh!

I did not spend my childhood in that period, but years ago people who had grown up there and remembered it told me about it. They said that in the time of Pishevari, in 1945–46, when Tabriz and parts of Azerbaijan were occupied by advancing Soviet forces and a so-called local government was established, only to be dispersed later, the Bolsheviks came to Tabriz, went to Khameneh, and organized a concert in Mirza Fath-Ali Akhundzadeh's name! Thus one man enjoyed support both under the tsars and under the Bolsheviks who overthrew the tsars. Do you see the contradictory character? What did the tsarist and communist regimes have in common? Opposition to religion and to Islam—and he was a champion of opposition to Islam.

Of course, in our view intellectualism in the true sense does not require opposition to religion or religious devotion. A person can be an intellectual in the sense everyone defines—forward-looking, intellectually active and oriented toward progress—and at the same time be religious and devout. He can be the late Dr. Beheshti, the martyred Motahhari, or many of the deeply believing religious intellectuals whom we have known. There is no necessity for him to oppose religion.

What is curious is that, once a lack of religious devotion is made a necessary defining condition of intellectualism, Allameh Tabatabaei—the greatest philosopher of our time, to whom distinguished philosophers and scholars such as Henry Corbin came from France and stayed for years to learn—does not count as an intellectual! Yet some fledgling poet who disbelieves in religion, tradition and Iranian identity and has spent a little time in Europe or America does count, and the longer his stay in Europe, the greater an intellectual he supposedly becomes! See what a mistaken definition, what an ugly and unsuitable current, was created under the name of intellectualism in Iran!

During the country's great events, intellectuals with these characteristics were present, but on the sidelines. At the time of the August 1953 coup, intellectuals waged no real struggle. The coup may seem remote to you, but the Pahlavi regime's harsh treatment of intellectuals who sometimes sympathized with Dr. Mossadegh or the national movement caused them to withdraw completely. No genuine resistance came from intellectual circles, although their calling required them to enter the arena for the people's benefit and future, to write poetry and prose, speak out, and enlighten society. They did none of these things.

Then came the events of June 5, 1963, the greatest confrontation between the people and the ruling regime in our country in that century. Imam Khomeini's speech in Qom on Ashura stirred such commotion that a huge popular uprising erupted in Tehran the next day and the day after, without any clearly designated leadership. Documents have been published showing the cabinet's discussions on how to confront it. Imagine the earthquake caused by that speech and the people's participation. The Imam acted in the strongest possible way and mobilized the people. Then the regime's soldiers entered the streets and opened fire. Several thousand people were killed and much blood was shed, although we never established an exact death toll.

In On the Service and Betrayal of Intellectuals, Al-e Ahmad says—I think these are roughly his words—that our Iranian intellectuals washed their hands in the blood of June 5! They did not utter a word. These very famous intellectuals who wrote poems, stories, articles and political analyses; who claimed to lead the people; who believed everyone should accept their opinions when published in newspapers or essays—they remained silent! That was how estranged they were from the people, and that estrangement continued.

Occasionally they made a very small gesture, but at the slightest reprimand from the authorities they retreated. One striking example was a well-known man who died some years ago. I do not want to give his name, but I shall name his work; those who recognize it will know. Before the revolution he wrote a play called A with a Hat, A without a Hat. We read it then. He depicted the role of the intellectual. In the symbolic story, “A without a Hat” stood for the British and “A with a Hat” for the Americans. The first act represented the period of British influence and the second the period of American influence. In both, ordinary social groups acted and struggled according to their circumstances, but the intellectual—called “the Gentleman on the Balcony”—remained entirely on the sidelines. He watched and occasionally spoke, but took absolutely no risks and did not participate. When the play reached us in Mashhad, I was speaking to students and young people after prayers and remarked that its author was himself the “Gentleman on the Balcony.” He had depicted and described himself: completely aloof.

Thus the worst thing Iranian intellectual circles could have done was what they did during the fifteen years of the Islamic movement: they stood completely aside! The result became clear: the people severed their ties with them entirely. To be fair, a tiny number entered the arena to some extent, including the late Al-e Ahmad himself. Even his students, friends and admirers did not truly enter; they acted only from a great distance.

The prisons were full of ordinary people, clerics, students, seminarians, workers and shopkeepers. Throughout those many years, the largest number of political prisoners were connected with the Imam's movement, because their activities seriously troubled the regime. Well-known figures whose names you recognize went to prison and screamed through hours of torture. But not those gentlemen!

Indeed, some who were jailed for something minor almost immediately produced letters of repentance! Among the well-known figures who now seek to bring about a reactionary intellectual movement in our time—whom I shall discuss—were people who wrote pleading, tearful letters from prison. We know them closely, and they know that we know them, though young people do not. By the time of the revolution, this group had proved itself untrustworthy as a source of intellectual leadership for the people.

Of course, a movement arose in the last year or two before the revolution. The wave of the uprising, carrying its message of knowledge and belief, entered different circles. Many people who had not believed in Islam came to believe through the movement. Many girls who had not believed in the hijab began wearing it during the movement, without anyone saying a word to them. As the Imam's Islamic movement expanded and gained momentum, and as its experience became more like Karbala, the more casualties, martyrs and sacrifices it suffered, the more supporters it won and the wider its message spread. As the revolution's message advanced, so too did the movement's message of religion and commitment to Islamic principles and teachings. This naturally encompassed a number of people, including particular individuals whom I do not wish to name. They joined the arena, and then the revolution came.

After the revolution's victory, intellectualism did not disappear in Iran; it continued, but a genuinely new intellectualism emerged. During the revolution, poets, writers, critics, researchers, directors, filmmakers, playwrights and painters emerged from two groups: people created and formed by the revolution, and people from the preceding era whom the revolution had thoroughly transformed. For the first time in almost a century since the beginning of Iranian intellectual activity, intellectualism became indigenous. Those most active and central to intellectual life—writers and poets—and the various other groups, including artists and painters, for the first time thought like Iranians, spoke like Muslims, and produced intellectual, artistic and literary works accordingly. A new era began.

There was resistance, of course, but the immense revolutionary movement—the kind of movement for which every idea, written word and action is a preparation, such as the movement the revolution brought about in our country—brings the greatest blessings. Consequently, the indigenous, Islamic intellectual movement and its many branches overshadowed everything else in the country. Composers, musicians, artists, literary figures and poets thought and worked in an Islamic way, or at least tried to do so. This was an entirely new and blessed development, and it continued.

The war became an arena in which these talents could emerge. You know that difficult events, including war, are among the factors that bring the arts and literature of any nation to fruition. Some of the most beautiful novels, finest films and perhaps greatest poems have been written, filmed or composed during or in connection with wars. Our war was no exception.

We were wronged in the war. Our entire nation was the victim of aggression and oppression. We had attacked nobody, given no one an excuse and not fired a single shot across the Iraqi border. But the nature of the revolution was such that a military attack would be launched against us.

One African national leader was Ahmed Sékou Touré, president of Guinea-Conakry. During my presidency he visited Iran several times, including once during the war. He told me not to be surprised by the war imposed on us. Whenever a revolution arises against colonial and domineering establishments and the influential powers of the world, one of the first things done against it is to incite one of its neighbors to attack it. “You too have come under this general rule,” he said. “They attacked you from one border, but I was attacked from five parts of my borders by five different countries!” His was a small country surrounded by many others. Having come to power through a revolution himself, he too had faced attacks.

All the people participated in the war. The role of leadership was paramount: leadership brought about the unified participation of the people. The Basij, the establishment of the Revolutionary Guards, the great mobilization of the army, the many activities undertaken and the support and cooperation of the people all intensified the atmosphere that intellectual life needed for its development and flourishing, and directed it along the right path.

What I am describing was the prevailing trend, not a universal rule; exceptions existed. During the war, one writer and novelist wrote a war story that actually condemned Iran in that war! See what happens when someone refuses under any circumstances to abandon mistaken positions. Iran's Ahvaz, Abadan and Khorramshahr had been attacked militarily through no choice of their own, and the Islamic Republic—its leadership, government, armed forces and people—had committed itself completely to defense. What fault could be found with that? Yet from beginning to end that novel criticizes, mocks and insults the people and officials of the region. Some members of the older intellectual circles produced such things. But that was not the general course: the prevailing current remained on the right path throughout and after the war.

In the development of intellectual life, this was progress and an advance consistent with intellectualism's very nature. Intellectualism is inherently forward-moving, and the right thing was for it to free itself from that old error and illness. This was impossible before the revolution; the revolution created the conditions that made the transformation possible.

One final point remains, and it is the very point that gives this discussion its title. Since the war, serious efforts have begun to return Iranian intellectualism to its pre-revolutionary sickness—to move backward, to become reactionary. That means once again rejecting religion and indigenous foundations, turning to the West, becoming unconditionally attached and dependent on it, accepting everything that comes from Europe or America, glorifying everything foreign and belittling everything that is our own. At its core, that entails humiliating the Iranian people and their foundations. I can see it happening.

Who are these people? One can make guesses, although I cannot claim definite knowledge here. There is a group that “did not believe in God even for the blink of an eye.” They never truly believed either in Islam or in Iran. During the years when divine, Islamic, religious, genuine Iranian intellectual currents—call them what you will—were present in Iran, they would not even raise their heads. They withdrew into corners or traveled abroad and found their object of worship, their qibla, their beloved, there. This nation, its traditions, history and culture meant nothing to them; naturally its future means nothing to them either. They may speak or make claims, but their past offers no evidence of sincerity. They care not about the people but about themselves.

Others may fall under their influence, impressed by grandiose titles. And some may be hired agents, though I cannot say that for certain. Literature, writing, art and poetry are among the things most easily put at the service of money; there is nothing surprising about that. Great poets have written verses praising rulers who deserved curses rather than praise. Many people have supported vile and ugly institutions for money, worldly gain, and desire when they should have rejected them. This is entirely possible. But, as I said, that is my conjecture, not verified information. They want to turn the course of things backward, and our Muslim intellectuals must not allow that.

When I say they must not allow it, I do not mean they should start quarrels or fights. Intellectual life is not an arena for fists. The arena of culture and intellectualism is culture itself, and its instruments are cultural instruments. Young people involved in intellectual pursuits must become active. Young people, develop yourselves. A nation seeking growth, perfection and progress must stand on firm foundations of intellectual conviction. A nation, generation or young person who entrusts themselves to an uncertain, faithless group that lacks belief in moral, religious and spiritual principles, and follows its words, will find the ground collapsing beneath them. The young generation would become what it was under the Pahlavi regime: despairing, unproductive, inclined toward corruption and ready to go astray. Redirecting it back to the right path would then require an immense effort, something like the Islamic Revolution, an event not easily repeated in this country in a century or even centuries.

We must preserve what we have achieved with all our strength. We must not permit people who spent many years in this country using intellectual and cultural tools without rendering any service to the people—at the very least they rendered none—and who never stood alongside the people in any major problem or crisis, never even kept pace with them, let alone led them, but always lagged behind in isolation, to return and make their intellectual and cultural outlook dominant. What we see appearing in some newspapers, magazines and cultural publications is an effort to return to the past, to revive the old sickness of intellectualism. This is a current issue, a fundamental and highly important one.

Of course, people styling themselves intellectuals can sit down and spin arguments about these matters, claiming that intellectualism and religion cannot coexist, that when religion enters a country it overshadows everything. Unfortunately the late Al-e Ahmad makes a statement along these lines in a footnote. In my view that was a historical error on his part.

He says that in the Safavid period, because religious learning, literary administration and scholarship were drawn into government circles—because Mir Damad, for example, sat alongside Shah Abbas—culture, literature, philosophy and art declined. That is mistaken. There has scarcely been another period like the Safavid era in the history of our literature. Al-e Ahmad was not a specialist in poetry; I believe his judgment resulted from unfamiliarity with the subject. Poets opposed to the Indian style spread an erroneous notion. The Indian style flourished in the Safavid period and continued through the Zand era and into the early Qajar period. Then another group emerged, the so-called revivalists associated with the Isfahan Literary Society, who strongly opposed the Indian style. Their poems never approached the quality of those of the Indian-style poets—the difference was enormous—but they were opposed to it. Since then it has been said that Safavid poetry was in decline. Not so! A great poet like Saeb belonged to the Safavid period. So did Kalim, Orfi, and Taleb Amoli—poets with few equals throughout the history of Persian verse. Nasrabadi, in his biographical anthology Tazkereh-ye Nasrabadi, names and describes nearly one thousand poets living in Isfahan in his own time. A city with a thousand poets! Good poets, moreover, not writers of nonsense. Their poems and the anthology survive. When and where have we seen its like?

In philosophy, Mulla Sadra, the greatest philosopher in the entire history of Islamic philosophy, belongs to the Safavid period. So do Mir Damad, the renowned mystic Feyz Kashani, and Lahiji, the celebrated theologian and philosopher. How can anyone claim that the Safavid era saw a decline in poetry? On the contrary, it was a period of splendor and a high point for literature and the arts. Here I mean poetry in particular; prose was also good, though it did not reach quite the same heights. The finest tilework and architecture also date from the Safavid era. Throughout history there are very few equivalents of the Sheikh Lotfollah Mosque in its category, Isfahan's Naqsh-e Jahan Square in its category, and those buildings in other categories. They belong to the Safavid period.

Of course, the Safavids did not bring poets into court to pay them. Nor am I seeking to defend the Safavid rulers. We oppose all kings. Kingship is bad; in fact a king cannot be good. Monarchy is wrong. The very notion of monarchy suggests ownership: someone calling himself a king considers himself the owner of his people, his so-called subjects. In Islam monarchy is rejected entirely. As I said at Friday prayers, the caliphate and religious guardianship are the opposite of monarchy. The Safavid kings were kings and I cannot defend them. But historically it is false to say that poetry and literature declined under the Safavids. Even now I hear that old assertion repeated on television, radio and elsewhere. No: the Safavid period was not an era of decline. After Hafez, no ghazal poet as great as Saeb appeared. Since Rudaki, no serious poet has produced as many verses as Saeb, who has two hundred thousand lines to his name. I mean a poet whose work merits serious consideration and defense; writers of nonsense can produce any quantity they wish. No city had as many poets, artists, scholars, philosophers and jurists as Isfahan. What sort of claim is this?

In any event, this is reactionary intellectualism: returning to the era when intellectualism was sick, to the intellectuals' indifference and lack of concern, to an intellectual establishment and movement indifferent to all the authentic indigenous traditions, history and culture of this nation. Anyone who raises that banner today is a reactionary, even if called an intellectual, poet, writer, researcher or critic. If a person raises the banner of a return to pre-revolutionary intellectualism, with the same characteristics and anti-religious, anti-traditional orientation, that person is reactionary. That is what I call reactionary intellectualism.

You students are yourselves among the intellectual strata. You should think about and work on this subject. If I were to speak at length, an hour would not suffice: there are abundant instances and examples, much to say, and many criticisms of what others have said on these questions. To cover them all would take far too long. God willing, we shall leave the continuation for another occasion and opportunity.

Peace be upon you, and God's mercy and blessings.

 

 


 

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Intellectualism Public Participation Revolutionary Art